- Read the papers.
- Answer these questions:
- Turing mentioned that that the suitability of
the Imitation Game as a substitute for the question
“Can machines think?” was debatable, but he never
really returned to that issue. Do you think it is a
good substitute? Why or why not? Why do you think Turing
proposed this substitute?
We can frame these questions in terms of signaling:
"thinking" is the quality we wish to determine
about the other, but it is invisible. We must instead rely on
observable signals as indicators of this quality. Turing is
proposing successful playing of the Imitation Game as the
signal - is this a reliable signal of intelligence? What
makes it reliable (or not)?
- Weizenbaum created ELIZA in part to show that
simple communication was not a reliable signal of thought.
He modeled it on a Rogerian psychologist: how did this
framework help people communicate with the program? How did
it affect their perception of its underlying intelligence?
As you look at the various contemporary chatbots, think about
and describe how the model of what type of being they are
affects one's interpretation of their inner state.
- In Being Real I discuss briefly the
possibility of agents that use voice, video, etc. to
communicate. How would such extended communication channels
affect the reliability of the signal as an indicator of
intelligence? If you are interested in exploring this
question more deeply, a good starting point is Steven
Harnad's paper "Other Bodies, Other Minds: A Machine Incarnation of an Old Philosophical Problem"
- Paro makes people feel better. It does
this, arguably, by deceptively signaling need and affection.
Is this a case where deception is a good thing? Is the case
of these ill patients a special case? Does it matter if
they know it is a robot? How does this differ from a live pet? How
do robot pets compare with real pets as companions say for healthy children. Which is preferrable? Why?
your essays by Monday midday.