- Grafen, A. Biological signals as handicaps
- Dawkins and Guilford. The corruption of honest signalling
- Endler., J. Some general comments on the evolution and design of animal communcation systems
- Zahavi and Zahavi. Introduction and chapter on Humans, from The Handicap Principle
- supplement: Bergstrom, C. An Introduction to the Theory of Honest Signalling
- Read the papers about signalling.
- Find two examples of some kind of signalling between humans. One should be an example that occurs in the physical (face to face / unmediated) world and the other, one that occurs online.
- Describe each example in detail
- What is the signal?
- What is the underlying quality being signalled?
- Who is the sender? Who is the receiver?
- What is the cost of the signal to the sender? And the cost to the receiver?
- Would you characterise this as a cooperative or a competitive relationship between signaller and receiver?
- Would you characterize the signal as an assessment signal (one whose honesty is assured through its cost, with the cost related to the quality being signalled) or a conventional signal (which is not inherently reliable, but where "probing" - and subsequent punishment - keeps the signal meaningful)?
- Is there dishonest signalling? How does this occur?
- Is the underlying quality one that changes frequently in time? If it is, does the signal changed? Is the signal given continously or occasionally, with individual or collective memory serving subsequently?
Readings are available outside of room 392 - or ask Veronica (lupampa@media.mit.edu)
Please submit the URL of your critique and sketch
online by Tuesday evening.